Understanding Kuhn: A Response to Marginalia
By Ryan W
In the margins of my copy of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the previous owner had scrawled the following multi-part question, probably while in a state of incredulity upon reading the contents of this book: “Is Kuhn just another postmodernist like Derrida? Does he believe in (scientific) truth? How does he explain the fact that Romans didn’t go to the Moon?” In this essay, I will seek to respond to this unknown questioner of Kuhn. First (I), I will attempt to briefly summarize Kuhn’s ideas and contend that they show he is not a postmodernist despite having had elements of his thought adopted by those who would identify as postmodern thinkers. Second (II), I will propose an understanding of Kuhn as advocating for a pragmatic conception of (scientific) truth. Finally (III), I will argue that Kuhn can indeed explain the fact that the Romans didn’t go to the Moon despite his noncumulative view of science.
I.
Postmodernism is a difficult concept to define. However, Gary Aylesworth provides a rough description of it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) as “a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning” (Aylesworth 2015). As our questioner has noticed, it sure seems like Kuhn fits this description of postmodernism on the surface. For instance, Kuhn seems to employ concepts such as paradigm shifts, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability to destabilize the traditional concept of scientific progress as steady and cumulative.
But what exactly is the traditional concept of scientific progress? Alexander Bird explains this traditional picture of scientific progress in the SEP as the belief that “science develops by the addition of new truths to the stock of old truths, or the increasing approximation of theories to the truth, and in the odd case, the correction of past errors” (Bird 2018). While progress may accelerate under the guidance of a particularly great scientist, the scientific method itself ensures generally steady, uniform progress. On the other hand, Kuhn argues that the development of science is not uniform like how the traditional picture makes it out to be at all, but that it alternates between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ periods (Kuhn 1962). Among these two, normal science is cumulative and generally denoted by scientists engaging in ‘puzzle-solving,’ in a way very much similar to the traditional picture. However, revolutionary science marks a stark departure from the traditional picture of scientific progress. These periods are not merely phases of accelerated progress, since the work done by scientists during them are fundamentally different from ‘puzzle-solving.’
See, during normal science, it inevitably occurs that not all of the puzzles that come up within a theoretical framework, or paradigm, are able to be solved, even with intensive effort. These cases are called ‘anomalies,’ and they build up, becoming more and more worrying until a critical mass is reached and science enters a revolutionary period (Kuhn 1962). This shift in attitude in which scientists become no longer confident in the existing paradigm is also called a ‘crisis.’ During periods of revolutionary science, some scientists seek to come up with new theories within new paradigms which are incommensurable with the old ones in an attempt to account for the anomalies and dissolve the crisis. ‘Incommensurable’ here refers to the fact that there are no common measures between paradigms. Because different paradigms are incommensurable, there is no rational way to convince supporters of one paradigm to adopt another. Rather, it can only be done through methods of persuasion or force, such as through institutions deciding who gets tenure or funding for their research. If a new paradigm succeeds in transplanting an old one in a paradigm shift to become the new framework around which scientists do puzzle-solving, then a scientific revolution is said to have occurred, and a new era of normal science begins.
This picture of scientific development is radically different in the sense that science is no longer seen as cumulative. Since, according to Kuhn, scientific revolutions involve a revision of existing scientific belief or practice, not all the achievements of the preceding period of normal science are preserved in a revolution (Bird 2018). Because of this nature of paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions, a later era of science may find itself lacking an explanation for a phenomenon that was considered sufficiently explained in an earlier era of science. This is what has become known as ‘Kuhn-loss’ (Bird 2018). Thus, under Kuhn, science cannot be said to progress cumulatively like how it is imagined in the traditional picture.
The question that remains now is whether or not Kuhn intends for his picture of the development of science to be destabilizing in the same way that postmodernist thinkers hold their ideas to be. I contend that he does not, since his picture of the development of science is purely descriptive, not normative. On the surface, it may seem that scientific revolutions should be sought after and welcomed on the basis that they apparently advance scientific development. However, Kuhn rejects this view, claiming that progress can only be made during periods of normal science if there is a strong commitment by the relevant scientific community to their current paradigm (Bird 2018). As Bird puts it, “this conservative resistance to the attempted refutation of key theories means that revolutions are not sought except under extreme circumstances” (Bird 2018). Thus, we can hardly say that Kuhn is detailing a “set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts” meant to “destabilize other concepts,” which is what characterizes postmodernism. It may be the case that Kuhn’s ideas do indeed destabilize the traditional picture of scientific development, but if so, it is only destabilizing in the sense that a new descriptive account of the world is destabilizing. It is by no means a “critical, strategic and rhetorical” set of normative ideas which prescribes a change in the way scientists do their work. Therefore, Kuhn is not “just another postmodernist like Derrida.”
II.
Pragmatic theories of truth as opposed to traditional correspondence theories of truth generally focus on relations to epistemic practice rather than relations to reality. The latter is generally the view that truth is the accurate relationship of a statement to something that exists in reality. The former is generally the view that the truth is what functions best for collective understanding and action between rational agents given their environment. For instance, the pragmatist philosopher William James proposes that truth be defined in terms of utility (Capps 2019). In response to our questioner who doubts whether or not Kuhn believes in (scientific) truth, I will propose that Kuhn does, just not in the traditional sense. Rather, Kuhn’s concept of scientific truth seems to be generally in-line with pragmatic theories of truth rather than the traditional correspondence ones.
First off, Kuhn denies that the increases in puzzle-solving power that a paradigm shift may entail would bring us closer to scientific truth under the traditional correspondence theory. It simply does not follow according to him that an improved nearness to truly describing reality may be inferred from an increase in this sort of power (Bird 2018). This is because the method by which puzzles are solved within paradigms are completely relative to them, a concept called the ‘paradigm-relativity of method’ (Kuhn 1962). What this means is that there is no universal book of scientific method, rather, different paradigms give different rules and constraints by which normal science is to progress under them. If any particular paradigm’s method has more puzzle-solving power, it is only relative to the ability to solve the puzzles in said paradigm as compared to methods from other paradigms, and not to puzzles in any other paradigms or any paradigm-independent reality, such as the noumenal world of Kant.
Thus, Kuhn rejects the teleological view of science wherein there is continual progress made toward truly describing reality as it is. Rather, Kuhn embraces an evolutionary perspective on scientific progress and truth (Bird 2018). Bird puts it well when he states that “the evolutionary development of an organism might be seen as its response to a challenge set by its environment… but that does not imply that there is some ideal form of the organism that it is evolving towards” (Bird 2018). In a similar way, scientific progress according to Kuhn occurs when theories evolve in response to puzzles, and as we mentioned earlier, progress is measured by its success in solving those puzzles within the current paradigm. It is not measured by its progress towards an ideal true theory independent of any paradigm (Bird 2018).
In short, scientific truth according to Kuhn echoes that of the pragmatists, who hold the view that the truth is what functions best for collective understanding and action between rational agents given their environment. As it turns out, Kuhn shares his evolutionary view of (scientific) truth with the pragmatists, notably John Dewey. As explained by David Hildebrand in the SEP, Dewey saw the determination of the truth as a continuous adaptation that “should be seen as an activity undertaken by interdependent organisms-in-environments” within “the larger picture of Darwinian evolutionary theory” (Hildebrand, 2018). Therefore, Kuhn does believe in (scientific) truth, just of the pragmatist kind rather than the traditional one.
III.
The big question now is as follows: how does Kuhn explain the fact that the Romans didn’t go to the Moon? To answer this, we will have to bring insights from both of the previous sections, namely that the development of science is heavily influenced by social factors such as existing power structures and political bodies, and that scientific progress is evolutionary in nature, responding through continuous adaptation to the challenges set by the environment. We will also have to bring in a new concept, namely ‘theory-laden observation’ (Kuhn 1962). Theory-laden observation refers to the notion that what scientists even consider to be scientifically significant or evidence which confirms or disconfirms their hypothesis is filtered through the lens of the theory or paradigm under which they are investigating. For example, the particular number ‘37’ in ‘37 degrees Celsius’ is only scientifically significant if it is interpreted as the result of a measurement process utilizing a thermometer working under the thermodynamic theory of temperature as the manifestation of thermal energy. What is also implicitly assumed by such an interpretation are various other theses about how the thermometer was used, how thermometers work, etc. (Bogen 2020). In a similar way, every observation which a scientist makes is done through the lens of their paradigmatic theory.
That the development of science is heavily influenced by social factors such as existing power structures and political bodies is inherent to Kuhn’s concept of scientific development through revolutions. Recall that because different paradigms are incommensurable, there is no rational way to convince supporters of one paradigm to adopt another. Rather, it can only be done through irrational methods of persuasion, such as through institutions deciding who gets tenure or funding for their research. The current holders of political power thus have considerable sway over the direction of scientific development.
Scientific progress is also evolutionary in nature, responding through continuous adaptation to the challenges set by the environment. In mid-20th century America, this environment was that of the Cold War and the Space Race. Political pressure to beat the Soviet Union in the race to the cosmos undoubtedly formed a huge selection factor in determining the adaptation of science and the direction of its application. It can be said that it was only because of this perfect storm of extraordinary pressures pushing scientists to aim for the Moon that humanity touched down upon the lunar surface in 1969. We haven’t been back since 1972, not because science has degenerated since then, but because the political and economic pressures to do so simply no longer exist to guide scientific development in that direction, at least for now.
Similarly, back in the days of Ancient Rome, there simply did not exist strong enough political, economic, or even cultural factors to guide the adaptation of science and the direction of its development toward an attempt to land on the Moon. Furthermore, because of the fact of theory-laden observation, the scientists, or perhaps natural philosophers, of Ancient Rome might not have even perceived the Moon as something able to be landed on. Perhaps it is only through the lens of modern astronomy that humans in the mid-20th century could’ve even considered the Moon as a sensible target for landing and exploration. Rather, the goals for the application of science that the Romans and other peoples of antiquity did have were shaped by their own political, economic, and cultural needs. Some of these feats, such as the construction of the Pyramids of Giza given the materials and manpower available at the time, elude the full understanding of science to this day, up to the point of causing conspiracy theories about alien intervention. Therefore, Kuhn can explain the fact that the Romans didn’t go to the Moon.
IV.
In conclusion, is Kuhn just another postmodernist like Derrida? No. It may be the case that Kuhn’s ideas do indeed destabilize the traditional picture of scientific development, but if so, it is only destabilizing in the sense that a new descriptive account of the world is destabilizing, not in the critical, normatively charged way of the postmodernists. Does he believe in (scientific) truth? Yes. It is only that Kuhn’s account of scientific truth broadly aligns closest with that of the pragmatist theories rather than the traditional correspondence ones. How does he explain the fact that Romans didn’t go to the Moon? Three concepts of his do so. First, the development of science is heavily influenced by social factors such as existing power structures and political bodies. Second, scientific progress is evolutionary in nature, responding through continuous adaptation to the challenges set by the environment. Third, observations are theory-laden. What scientists even consider to be scientifically significant is filtered through the lens of the dominant paradigm of the day.
Works Cited
Aylesworth, Gary, "Postmodernism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/postmodernism/>.
Bird, Alexander, "Thomas Kuhn", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/thomas-kuhn/>.
Bogen, James, "Theory and Observation in Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/science-theory-observation/>.
Capps, John, "The Pragmatic Theory of Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/truth-pragmatic/>.
Hildebrand, David, "John Dewey", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/dewey/>.
Kuhn, Thomas. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
